Despite Poor Financial Results, Diminishing Pipeline, Multiple Settlements of Legal Cases, Outgoing Pfizer CEO Got Over $24 Million

It is the season for share-holders' meetings of big US publicly held corporations, and as the proxy statements prepared for these meetings, prepare for more eye-popping, jaw-dropping examples of executive compensation. 

Pfizer's 2010 CEO Compensation
The AP (via the Wall Street Journal) just noted the compensation given to Jeffrey Kindler, the outgoing (in 2010) CEO of Pfizer, Inc, the world's largest pharmaceutical company:

Former Pfizer Inc. Chairman and CEO Jeffrey B. Kindler may have left the world's largest drugmaker abruptly last December, but he didn't leave empty-handed thanks to a compensation package valued almost $22 million.

Kindler received a 60 percent increase last year over his 2009 compensation, according to an Associated Press analysis of a Pfizer regulatory filing Tuesday.

The New York-based drugmaker gave Kindler a salary and performance-related bonus totaling $4.9 million, a $4.5 million severance payment and more than $12 million in stock and option awards. The company also will continue his health coverage for 12 months 'at active employee rates,' the filing said.

In fact, perusal of the new 2011 Pfizer proxy statement shows that Kindler, who stepped down on 5 December, 2010, made even more based on Pfizer's own calculations, $24,688, 849. Curiously, Ian Read, the CEO after 5 December, and previously Group President, Worldwide Pharmaceutical Business, received $17,396,112, despite only being CEO for 26 days.

Pay for What Kind of Performance?

These opulent pay packages stand in contrast to Pfizer's performance under Kindler and its financial results in 2010:

Kindler was ousted by Pfizer's board unexpectedly Dec. 6 after four years of languishing share prices and several failures of promising drugs in late testing, including a successor to cholesterol fighter Lipitor, the world's top-selling drug. Pfizer will lose U.S. patent protection in November for Lipitor.

Also,

Pfizer's 2010 net income fell 4 percent to $8.26 billion, or $1.02 per share. Revenue totaled $67.81 billion, up 36 percent, thanks to $18.1 billion from sales of Wyeth products.

Its stock price slipped 4 percent to close 2010 at $17.31, while the Standard & Poor's 500 index climbed 12.8 percent.

Furthermore, the compensation given the former and current CEO also stood in sharp contrast to Pfizer's amazing track record of recent unethical behavior.   Pfizer paid a $2.3 billion settlement in 2009 of civil and criminal allegations and a Pfizer subsidiary entered a guilty plea to charges it violated federal law regarding its marketing of Bextra (see post here).  Pfizer was involved in three other major cases from then to early 2010, including two involving settlements of fraud charges, and one in which a jury found the company guilty of violating the RICO (racketeer-influenced corrupt organization) statute (see post here).  The company was listed as one of the pharmaceutical "big four" companies in terms of defrauding the government (see post here).  Pfizer's Pharmacia subsidiary settled allegations that it inflated drugs costs paid by New York in early 2011 (see post here).   Just yesterday a settlement was announced in a long-running class action case which involved allegations that another Pfizer subsidiary had exposed many people to asbestos (see this story in Bloomberg).

Despite Pfizer's recent dismal financial performance, clotted drug pipeline, and unfortunate ethical/ legal track record, the company's board compensation committee reported thus:

The Committee believes that Pfizer�s executive compensation program implements and achieves the goals of our executive compensation philosophy. Pfizer�s executive compensation philosophy, which is set by the Committee, is to align each executive�s compensation with Pfizer�s short-term and long-term performance and to provide the compensation and incentives needed to attract, motivate and retain key executives who are crucial to Pfizer�s long-term success.

Who Provided "Stewardship" of Pfizer?
So I had to ask: who were these people who thought that compensation of over $24 million was somehow "aligned" with declining profits, declining revenues, little output of new drugs, and multiple legal settlements of charges like fraud and violating the RICO act?

Here is a list of Pfizer's board of directors in 2010, and some relevant affiliations, taken from Pfizer's web-site, and where indicated, elsewhere (color coding to be explained below)

- Dennis A. Ausiello, M.D. -
Jackson Professor of Clinical Medicine at Harvard Medical School and Chief of Medicine at Massachusetts General Hospital since 1996.
Member of the Institute of Medicine....
Director of TARIS BioMedical, Inc.
(per Research!America bio) advisor to drug delivery and biosensing start-up companies Entra, BIND Biosciences, and Seventh Sense Biosystems, Inc., to drug-discovery startup companies Promedior and Pulmatrix, to Proventys, an evidence-based medicine delivery system, and to Ore Pharmaceuticals and Polaris, investment and venture capital companies working in the biotech and device area.

- Michael S. Brown, M.D. -
Distinguished Chair in Biomedical Sciences since 1989 and Regental Professor since 1985 at the University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center at Dallas.
Member of ... the Institute of Medicine,....
Director of Regeneron Pharmaceuticals, Inc.

- M. Anthony Burns -
Chairman Emeritus since 2002, Chairman of the Board from 1985 to 2002, Chief Executive Officer from 1983 to 2000, and President from 1979 to 1999 of Ryder System, Inc., a provider of transportation and logistics services.
Life Trustee of the University of Miami.

- Robert N. Burt -
Retired Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of FMC Corporation, a chemicals manufacturer, and FMC Technologies Inc., a machinery manufacturer....
Life Trustee of the Rehabilitation Institute of Chicago

- W. Don Cornwell -
Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of Granite Broadcasting Corporation from 1988 until his retirement in August 2009 and Vice Chairman until December 2009.
(per Wallace Foundation web-site) He previously served as vice president, investment banking division, of Goldman Sachs.

- Frances D. Fergusson, Ph.D. -
President Emeritus of Vassar College since 2006 and President from 1986 to 2006. Served on the Mayo Clinic Board for 14 years, the last four years as its Chairman, and as President of the Board of Overseers of Harvard University from 2007 through 2008.

- William H. Gray III -
Co-Chairman of GrayLoeffler, LLC (formerly the Amani Group), a business advisory and consulting firm. Chairman of the Amani Group from 2004 through September 2009.
Currently Director of ... J. P. Morgan Chase & Co.

- Constance J. Horner -
Guest Scholar from 1993 until 2005 at The Brookings Institution....

- James M. Kilts -
Founding Partner, Centerview Partners Management, LLC, a private equity firm, since 2006.
(Per Centerview Partners web-site) Centerview Partners' investment banking advisory business serves some of the largest companies globally in a broad range of industries, with particular expertise in Food & Consumer Products, Financial Institutions, General Industrials, Healthcare, Media & Entertainment ....
The firm has executed many significant transactions in recent years, including:
Altria's $113 billion spin-off of Philip Morris International, its $62 billion spin-off of Kraft and its $11.7 billion acquisition of UST...
Facet Biotech's $722 million sale to Abbott Labs;
OSI Pharmaceuticals' $4.0 billion sale to Astellas Pharma;

- George A. Lorch -
Chairman Emeritus of Armstrong Holdings, Inc., a global manufacturer of flooring and ceiling materials,....

- John P. Mascotte -
Retired President and Chief Executive Officer of Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Kansas City, Inc.,...

- Suzanne Nora Johnson -
Retired Vice Chairman, Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.,...
Director of American International Group, Inc., .... Board member of the American Red Cross, The Brookings Institution, ... and the University of Southern California.
(per Milken Institute web-site) on the board of numerous not-for-profit organizations, including ... RAND Health ....
She is on the Advisory Board of Councilors of Harvard Medical School

- Ian C. Read -
President and Chief Executive Officer since December 2010.

- Stephen W. Sanger -
Chairman of General Mills, Inc.
Currently Director of ... Wells Fargo & Company.

- William C. Steere, Jr. -
Chairman Emeritus of Pfizer Inc. since 2001.
Currently Director of Health Management Associates, Inc.
Director of the New York University Medical Center ...; and Member of the Board of Overseers of Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center.

Of Pfizer's 14 directors (excluding its CEO), seven have or had leadership positions at teaching hospitals, academic medical centers, medical schools or their parent universities. Three have or had leadership positions at other influential non-profit health care organizations. 


Two had leadership positions at potentially competing pharmaceutical or biotechnology companies.

Two had leadership positions at companies that finance pharmaceutical, biotechnology and other health related companies.

One had a leadership position at a health insurance company.

One had a leadership position at a for-profit hospital operating company.

Four had leadership positions in financial services corporations, including some that were implicated in the global financial collapse, and/or required massive federal bail-outs to avoid collapse.

It seems that every time we look at the boards of directors or trustees who are supposed to provide stewardship to a troubled health care organization, we see a similar pattern.  Just as we recently said about the Johnson and Johnson board, ....
 
Summary
 
So here we have the latest striking case that indicates the confluence of forces that can lead to health care dysfunction. Not only has the compensation given to health care leaders got so large that it is per se a cause of increased health spending, but also, and more importantly, such compensation often provides perverse incentives that perpetuate mismanagement, raising costs and lowering quality. This situation appears to be enabled by governance (or "stewardship") by individuals who are often fellow members of the CEOs' club, and hence who may feel more sympathy with the executives they are supposed to supervise than the stockholders whose financial interests they are supposed to protect, or the public whom the companies' products and services are supposed to benefit. Moreover, these individuals often have conflicts of interest which may mitigate against objective scrutiny of the executives they are supposed to oversee. Finally, these individuals often may come from corporate cultures which do not espouse the values that we in health care are supposed to uphold. (See this post and its links for other examples of the sorts of people who are supposed to provide stewardship to health care organizations.)


So to repeat once more-

I strongly believe that there needs to be much more investigation, academic, journalistic, and perhaps legal, of the identity, nature, and culture of the leaders of health care, and their relationships. A few bloggers cannot do it all. Obviously, the anechoic effect mitigates against medical and health care academics looking into their own leaders. However, failing to understand who is leading our march to the brink of health care failure ought not to be something such academics would want on their conscience.

Finally, and obviously, health care organizations need leaders that uphold the core values of health care, and focus on and are accountable for the mission, not on secondary responsibilities that conflict with these values and their mission, and not on self-enrichment. Leaders ought to be rewarded reasonably, but not lavishly, for doing what ultimately improves patient care, or when applicable, good education and good research.

If we do not fix the severe problems affecting the leadership and governance of health care, and do not increase accountability, integrity and transparency of health care leadership and governance, we will be as much to blame as the leaders when the system collapses.

ADDENDUM (23 March, 2011) - See also comments by Merrill Goozner on the GoozNews blog.

Despite Recalls, Legal Settlements, Guilty Plea, Johonson & Johnson Board Paid CEO $29 Million, Says He "Met Expectations"

For our latest story about the tremendous disconnect between the pay and performance of leaders of health care organizations, we turn to Reuters. 

Astronomical Pay

Despite having a very bad 2010, Johnson and Johnson continued to reward its CEO royally:

After a year in which Johnson & Johnson's product quality control was deemed such a shambles that the U.S. government will oversee some plants, the board had praise for Chief Executive William Weldon and awarded him almost $29 million in overall compensation.

The once golden reputation of the diversified healthcare giant was severely tarnished by seemingly endless recalls of widely used consumer products as well as recalls of medical devices and products from other units in 2010.

U.S. consumer product sales fell by more than 19 percent in 2010 and the company's 2011 forecast for earnings growth of only 1 percent to 3 percent fell shy of Wall Street projections.

Weldon's compensation was trimmed 7 percent, but in what appears to be a disconnect with the reality of its situation, J&J's (JNJ.N) board, in a year-end regulatory filing, said his performance 'generally met expectations' despite a year in which 'operational sales declined and fell below the goals for the year.'

'The board believes that Mr Weldon provided strong leadership during a very demanding year and has worked to resolve multiple challenging issues and position the company for future growth,' it said in the filing.

The rash of consumer medicine recalls in 2009 and 2010 were largely responsible for the first back-to-back years of company sales declines since World War Two.

Last week, U.S. health regulators filed a consent decree against J&J's McNeil consumer unit that will put some of its manufacturing plants under government supervision for at least five years.
The McNeil unit has recalled more than 300 million bottles and packages of Tylenol, Motrin, Rolaids, Benadryl and other products in the past year over faulty manufacturing and quality control problems.
The recalls cost the company $900 million in sales last year and hurt earnings, and Weldon was called to testify before Congress about problems that left pharmacy and supermarket shelves without Children's Tylenol.

But Weldon's 2010 compensation fell just 7 percent to $28.7 million from the $30.8 million he received in 2009. His performance bonus for 2010 was down 45 percent to $1.98 million.

The Wall Street Journal article on Weldon's pay also mentioned that Weldon also received " perquisites and other benefits in 2010 [which] included personal use of company aircraft, valued at $89,796; a car and driver for commuting and other personal transportation valued at $29,635; and a nominal amount of home security system monitoring fees."

The 2011 Johnson and Johnson proxy statement also noted that the other four of the five most highly paid Johnson and Johnson executives received compensation valued from $5,632,285 to $8,851,965 in 2010. In particular, Ms Colleen A Goggins, who retired under fire as head of the embattled Johnson and Johnson consumer group, walked away with $7,738,614 in 2010.

Other Aspects of Bad Company Performance

The WSJ Health Blog has been keeping an eye on the running total of Johnson and Johnson recalls. On 9 March, 2011, the list included 18 separate recalls of various different drugs and devices since July, 2009, from over-the-counter cold medications to sutures and hip replacements.

While suffering such a massive breakdown of the ability to perform the company's most basic function, to supply pure, unadulterated medicines and well-made devices, the company has also suffered from ethical lapses which were not listed in the Reuters article. In 2010, these included a jury verdict that the company had committed marketing fraud in its promotion of the atypical anti-psychotic drug Respirdal (see post here), and a guilty plea to a misdemeanor for and civil settlement of charges of "misbranding" Topamax by Johnson and Johnson subsidiary Ortho-McNeil-Janssen Pharmaceuticals (see post here).

Of course, we once speculated that the Johnson and Johnson CEO commanded such astronomical pay in part based on his ability to influence US government health policy in favor of his and his company's interests (see this post).

Who Made Up the Board Who Was Responsible?

Responsible for the astronomical amounts paid to Mr Weldon despite his company's ongoing inability to make pure, unadulterated medicines, and to other executives who presided over the company's recalls, guilty plea, and legal settlements was the company's board of directors.  Its members are listed below.  For explanation of the color coding, see the explanation below:

• Mary Sue Coleman - President, University of Michigan.
• James G Cullen - Retired Chairman and CEO, Bell Atlantic Corp
• Ian E L Davis - Senior Advisor, Apax Partners; Former Chairman and Worldwide Managing Director, McKinsey & Company, non-executive director, BP plc
• Michael M E Johns - Chancellor, Emory University, Past Chair of the Council of Teaching Hospitals, member of the editorial board, JAMA, chair of the publication committee, Academic Medicine
• Susan L Lindquist - Member and Former Director, Whitehead Institute for Biomedical Research, Co-Founder of FoldRx Pharmaceuticals, Inc, a subsidiary of Pfizer Inc.
• Anne M Mulcahy - Former Chairman and CEO, Xerox Corp, director of the Washington Post Company, previously director of Citigroup Inc, and Federal National Association (Fannie Mae)
• Leo F Mullin - Retired Chairman and CEO, Delta Airlines, director of Education Management Corporation
• William D Perez -Senior Advisor, Geenhill & Co, Inc, Trustee of Cornell University and Northwestern Hospital
• Charles Prince - Senior Counselor, Albright Capital Management LLC, Retired Chairman and CEO, Citigroup
• David Satcher - Director, Center of Excellent on Health Disparities, Director, Satcher Health Leadership Institute and Poussaint-Satcher-Crosby Chair in Mental Health, Morehouse School of Medicine, and trustee of the Kaiser Family Foundation

Of Johnson and Johnson's 10 directors (excluding its CEO), four have leadership positions at teaching hospitals, academic medical centers, medical schools or their parent universities.  Of these, two also had leadership positions at other influential non-profit health care organizations, including medical journals, a teaching hospital association, and a charitable foundation.

One had a management position at a competing pharmaceutical company.

Four had leadership positions in  financial services corporations, including some that were implicated in the global financial collapse, and/or required massive federal bail-outs to avoid collapse.

Three had had leadership positions in other organizations now under fire , that is, McKinsey, for the role of one of its former executives in an alleged insider trading scandal (e.g., latest coverage in the NY Times); several for-profit higher education companies caught up in allegations of luring students destined to fail in order to collect tuition funded by government loans;  and BP, under investigation for its role in a massive oil spill.

Summary

So here we have the latest striking case that indicates the confluence of forces that can lead to health care dysfunction.  Not only has the compensation given to health care leaders got so large that it is per se a cause of increased health spending, but also, and more importantly, such compensation often provides perverse incentives that perpetuate mismanagement, raising costs and lowering quality.  This situation appears to be enabled by governance by individuals who are often fellow members of the CEOs' club, and hence who may feel more sympathy with the executives they are supposed to supervise than the stockholders whose financial interests they are supposed to protect, or the public whom the companies' products and services are supposed to benefit.  Moreover, these individuals often have conflicts of interest which may mitigate against objective scrutiny of the executives they are supposed to oversee.  Finally, these individuals often may come from corporate cultures which do not espouse the values that we in health care are supposed to uphold.  (See this post and its links for other examples of the sorts of people who are supposed to provide stewardship to health care organizations.)

So to repeat once more-

I strongly believe that there needs to be much more investigation, academic, journalistic, and perhaps legal, of the identity, nature, and culture of the leaders of health care, and their relationships. A few bloggers cannot do it all. Obviously, the anechoic effect mitigates against medical and health care academics looking into their own leaders. However, failing to understand who is leading our march to the brink of health care failure ought not to be something such academics would want on their conscience.

Finally, and obviously, health care organizations need leaders that uphold the core values of health care, and focus on and are accountable for the mission, not on secondary responsibilities that conflict with these values and their mission, and not on self-enrichment. Leaders ought to be rewarded reasonably, but not lavishly, for doing what ultimately improves patient care, or when applicable, good education and good research.

If we do not fix the severe problems affecting the leadership and governance of health care, and do not increase accountability, integrity and transparency of health care leadership and governance, we will be as much to blame as the leaders when the system collapses.

ADDENDUM (17 March, 2011) - Also see comments on by Jim Edwards on the Placebo Effect blog: "heads he wins, tails shareholders lose," as do patients and doctors. 

"Making Their Numbers" - Examples of the Perverse Effect of Incentives Based on Short-Term Financial Targets in Health Care

Last week, we discussed how the large incentives for pharmaceutical executives to meet short term financial targets (that is, "making their numbers") may be an important cause of their firms' decreasing capacity to fulfill their most basic mission, manufacturing pure, unadulterated medicines. 

In the news recently were two examples of how other health care leaders are incentivized to meet short-term financial targets.

University of California

The first, and bigger example appeared in the San Francisco Chronicle. First, note that the University of California system is currently in dire shape:

Finances are so dire at the University of California that it might have to turn away qualified students,....

Also,

UC President Mark Yudof told the regents that UC will need to close a $1 billion budget gap next year. He said layoffs and course reductions are inevitable, and that he expects to have to turn away 20,000 to 30,000 qualified students over the next decade because the university won't have the money to educate them.

However, that did not stop the university from giving bonuses to a variety of employees, including larger bonuses for higher-ranking managers

UC has still found a way to reward hundreds of employees with more than $4 million in incentive pay and raises.

At the regents meeting Thursday in San Diego, UC officials reported giving rewards of $150 to $41,205 to nearly 1,500 UCSF employees who met performance targets, raising the pay of some campus executives to above market rate, and providing 10 percent raises of about $20,000 a year to three executives at their Oakland headquarters.


The executives, who have various financial responsibilities for the UC system, will earn between $216,370 and $247,500 in base pay.

'Whether a budget crisis or not, the university still has to be able to pay competitive salaries and incentives consistent with industry standards,' said Steve Montiel, a spokesman for the university. 'The university has no problem paying incentives to be competitive.'

Note that the bonuses were apparently mainly based on short-term financial goals,

[UCSF spokeswoman Amy] Pyle said the rewards were issued because those employees met targets for saving money and streamlining procedures - but that the incentive program for that group has now been suspended because of the budget crisis.

Note that despite the fact that the University has long-term financial woes, the biggest bonuses went to finance executives whose short-term performance obviously did not have much effect on these long-term problems:

One of them, Grace Crickette, UC's chief risk officer, 'has saved the university over $100 million by driving down the cost of workers' compensation, negotiating much more advantageous terms with our insurance company,' Taylor said. The raises 'are a small price to pay for people working at the highest level.'

That rationale failed to convince representatives of UC's lowest-paid workers.

'The lowest-paid workers do a lot to save money too, and we've actually told them how. But our workers are being hit' with higher costs for their own benefits, said Lakesha Harrison, president of the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, which represents custodians, groundskeepers, patient-care workers and other employees earning less than $40,000.

Also,

At UC Berkeley, for example, the new vice chancellor for administration and finance will earn a base salary of $375,000 - 9 percent higher than the salary midpoint of $344,000 earned by colleagues at other universities, UC officials reported.

At UCLA, the chief financial officer of the hospital system will receive a 10.5 percent raise, bringing his salary to $420,000 from $380,000 as a hedge against the possibility that he would go somewhere else. The campus called it a 'pre-emptive retention salary adjustment.'

So while the University of California has long-term financial woes, so severe that they will likely require major curtailment of fulfillment of its major academic mission, its leadership had no problem handing out bonuses for meeting short-term financial goals whose achievement obviously did not forestall the current problems. The biggest bonuses went to financial managers, rationalized by their supposed performance "at the highest level," or their need to prevent them from going "somewhere else." However, obviously the long-term FINANCIAL performance of the University is its current biggest problem, suggesting that overall these financial managers are not doing so well. Thus, the way the University handed out bonuses for people "making their numbers" seemed completely at odds with the University's inability to make its numbers in the long-run. Of course, the bonuses also seemed entirely unrelated to the University's ability, or lack thereof to fulfill its mission.

Erlanger Health System

The Erlanger Health System is "an academic medical center associated with the UT College of Medicine Chattanooga." The Chattanooga (TN) Times Free Press reported:

Erlanger Health System executives took home bigger bonuses in December compared with the awards paid out the year before, despite recording lower profits.

In December, 123 management-level Erlanger employees split $1.9 million in bonus payments, $200,000 more than the total awarded in bonuses in fiscal year 2009.

President and CEO Jim Brexler received a $192,395 bonus in December on top of his base salary of $550,000.

The payments were based on the hospital's performance in fiscal year 2010, which ended in June of last year. The hospital's operating profit of $8.58 million, and other performance measurements that year, met pre-established criteria approved by the hospital's board of trustees.

The irony is that by the time the bonuses for fiscal year 2010 were awarded, it was already known that this year's finances are not so good:

Fiscal year to date, Erlanger has earned a $1.3 million profit, compared with a budgeted $6 million profit, according to financial statements released at the hospital's Budget and Finance Committee Monday.

Of course, one rationale for the bonuses is that Erlanger's executives are above average, just like, it seems, finance executives at the University of California (as noted above), and maybe all other health care organizational leaders:

'It takes a real expertise to deal in health care. ... Just to make any positive operating margin is great,' said Kim White, an Erlanger trustee and chairwoman of Erlanger's Management and Board Evaluation Committee, which sets the criteria that determines whether bonus pay will be awarded and how much.

'It's tough for people who don't have jobs to look at bonuses, but we look at this as a piece of their total compensation package.'

Of course managers and executives may have "real expertise," as noted above, or be in charge of some initiatives that saves money (as noted above in the case of a UC executive.)  However, there may be many other people who work for the organization with "real expertise," some of whose expertise may be more directly related to the organization's primary mission.  Also, as the union leader noted above, even low-paid workers may have ideas for saving money.  However, the big bonuses or raises given to reward only the managers' expertise, or prevent only the managers from finding other jobs, show the exceptional treatment given to health care managers and executives, perhaps because they tend to answer to governing bodies (boards of trustees or directors) run by other managers and executives.

Summary

There is increasing evidence that bonuses given to employees of health care organizations, particularly high-level managers and executives, are predominantly tied to short-term financial goals, e.g., "making their numbers." In my humble opinion, these are important perverse incentives, driving people to actions that disregard, or may even subvert the organizations' fundamental missions.

While it is desirable for all health care organizations to be run in a business-like manner, and for not-for-profit health care organizations to have competent financial management, these are means to an end. The mission of health care organizations is health care.

The main priority of non-profit organizations (or NGOs) should be to uphold their missions, not to make surpluses. Avoiding deficits, or making surpluses are means to uphold the mission, but ought to be subservient to the mission.

While for-profit health care corporations are meant to make a profit, in the long run their profitability should depend on whether the health care products they make or services they provide are fit for purpose, that is, further health care of individual patients or populations. Putting short-term financial goals ahead of making quality products (e.g., making pure and unadulterated medicines as noted in our previous post) will ultimately be bad for patients, for public health, and for the long-term financial health of the corporation.

Therefore, I submit that incentives for employees should be based on how their work upholds the primary mission. It may not be unreasonable to have some incentives based on long-term financial goals for financial executives of health care organizations. However, even those should be explicitly tied to mission fulfillment.

However, as health care leaders seemed to have learned from leaders of financial services firms, the emphasis on incentives based on short-term financial goals seems to only be increasing. Failure to address these increasingly perverse incentives will only lead to increasing health care dysfunction.

BLOGSCAN - Charles Ferguson, "Inside Job," and Parallels and Interlinks with the Health Care Crisis

On the Naked Capitalism blog, there is a video clip of an interview with Charles Ferguson, who directed Inside Job (see this post).  It is highly recommended, if as disturbing as the movie.  Look for the parallels with health care, and think about how the health care crisis is interlinked with the global financial crisis.  See the movie if you haven't already.

On the Interconnectedness of the Leadership of Health Care Organizations: the Abbott Laboratories Case

We just posted about some misbehavior by Abbott Laboratories: a physician Abbott paid as a "key opinion leader" to help market its cardiac stents was accused of inserting stents in many patients who had no need for them; Abbott settled for over $400 million a lawsuit alleging the company defrauded Medicare and Medicaid; and it settled an unrelated suit for over $40 million alleging the company paid kickbacks to physicians for prescribing its drugs.  I thus thought it would be interesting to see how well paid are the corporate leaders who presided over these activities, and who are the board members who were supposed to be providing stewardship of this company.

According to the company's 2010 proxy statement, the five highest-paid executives were:

Miles D White, Chairman of the Board and CEO - $26,213,966 total compensation
Thomans C Freyman, Executive Vice President, Finance, and CFO - $9,561,227
Olivier Bohuon, Executive Vice President, Abbott Pharmaceutica Group - $5,232,589
Laura J Schumacher, Executive Vice President, General Counsel, and Secretary - $5,724,060
James V Mazzo, Senior Vice President, Abbott Medical Optics - $10,394,085

Now, let us turn to the company's board of directors.  Note that I looked for board members who also held leadership positions in other health care organizations whose interests may not be aligned with the corporation.  I also looked for those who held leadership positions in the discredited financial services corporation who helped usher in the global financial collapse.  (I  used similar methodolgy here.)

Abbott currently has 12 board members, including

• Robert J Alpert MD - Ensign Professor of Medicine, Professor of Internal Medicine, and Dean of the Yale School of Medicine.  He also "serves as a Director on the Board of Yale-New Haven Hospital."
• Roxanne S Austin - President and Chief Executive Officer, Move Networks Inc, and President, Austin Investment Advisors
• William M Daley -"Vice Chairman and Head of the Office of Corporate Responsibility and Chairman of the Midwest, JP Morgan Chase & Co."  He is the board of directors of  "Loyola University of Chicago and Northwestern University."
• W James Farrell - Retired Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Illinois Tool Works Inc
• H Laurence Fuller - Retired Co-Chairman of BP Amoco, former chief executive officer of Amoco
• William A Osborne - Retired Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Northern Trust Corporation and the Northern Trust Company.  He is "Chairman of the Board of Trustees of Northwestern University."
• Rt Honorable Lord Owen - Chairman of Europe Steel Ltd
• Roy S Roberts - Managing Director, Reliant Equity Investors.
• Samuel C Scott III - Retired Chairman,  President and Chief Executive Officer of Corn Products International.  He "currently serves on the board of directors of Bank of New York Mellon Corporation."  He also is on the board of "Northwestern Healthcare."
• William D Smithburg - Retired Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer of Quaker Oats Company.  He is on the "board of trustees of Northwestern University."
• Glenn F Tilton - Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer of UAL Corporation and United Airlines Inc.  He is on the "board of directors of Northwestern Memorial Hospital."
• Miles D White - Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer, Abbott Laboratories, "is on the board of trustees of "Northwestern University." 

Of Abbott's 12 directors, seven have leadership positions at teaching hospitals, academic medical centers, medical schools or their parent universities (Northwestern University, its medical school and teaching hospitals, in particular, are stewarded by six Abbott directors). 

Two have leadership positions in  financial services corporations that were implicated in the global financial collapse.  (Note that JP Morgan Chase staffers helped to invent some of the kinds of financial derivatives widely viewed as causative of the collapse, but the firm itself did not fail. [See Tett G. Fool's Gold.]  Through TARP, the US government took preferred equity stakes in both JP Morgan Chase and Bank of New York Mellon.  [See Ritholtz B.  Bailout Nation. p. 222]) 

Two more are leaders of financial services firms.  All but one are current or former high-level hired executives (seven are or were CEOs), or chairpersons or co-chair persons of corporations (the one exception is a dean of a medical school.) 

Note how similar our findings were here to those found after our perusal of the boards of Genzyme and Medtronic (see post here).   So we find again that executives of health care organizations who preside over various questionable activities not only rarely pay any penalty, but usually become extremely wealthy in the process.

We also find how interconnected is the leadership of health care.  The boards and leadership of drug and device companies overlap with the boards and leadership of medical schools, teaching hospitals, and their parent universities. 

Yet, as we have noted before, there are obvious conflicts.  In particular, teaching hospitals and medical schools are supposed to provide unbiased teaching, including about issues relevant to drug and device corporations, such as choice of diagnostic strategies and treatments, and relevant health policy.  They are supposed to perform unbiased research, including research that evaluates drugs and devices.  They are supposed to provide the best possible patient care at a reasonable cost, which relates to choices of and prices paid for drugs and devices. 

On the other hand, drug and device companies are supposed to put making a profit for their share-holders first.  The directors of such companies, like the directors of all for-profit corporations, are supposed to show an unyielding loyalty to their companies' financial health and profits, although contemporary corporate directors have been accused of acting more like cronies of the hired management.  (See this post.)

Also, we note that the vast majority of people chosen as stewards of a given health care organization are current or former top hired executives of other corporations.  The board members, that is, stewards of health care organizations, to whom the top hired executives reports, are usually not people with large ownership interests in the organizations (in the case of public, for-profit corporations.)  For the most part, they also do not seem to be people with clearly demonstrated devotion to the values of health care, in particular, putting the care of individual patients first, and advancing health care teaching and research.  Instead, they seem to be people with the perspective of hired executives, who may be prone to putting the interests of hired executives, rather than patients, doctors, teachers, scientists or the public at large, first.

So here is another admittedly limited case study of the board of directors, that is, the ostensible stewards of a health care corporation, selected this time because of its history of ethical missteps, which showed  - that the leadership of health care organizations is incredibly interrelated, interlocked, incestuous.  Again, it appears that top leaders of various health care organizations may be more familiar with and identify more with each other, and with other hired executives and managers, than with their organizations, their organizations' missions, and their organizations' professionals, staff, students, clients, and patients.

So to repeat-

I strongly believe that there needs to be much more investigation, academic, journalistic, and perhaps legal, of the identity, nature, and culture of the leaders of health care, and their relationships. A few bloggers cannot do it all. Obviously, the anechoic effect mitigates against medical and health care academics looking into their own leaders. However, failing to understand who is leading our march to the brink of health care failure ought not to be something such academics would want on their conscience.

Finally, and obviously, health care organizations need leaders that uphold the core values of health care, and focus on and are accountable for the mission, not on secondary responsibilities that conflict with these values and their mission, and not on self-enrichment. Leaders ought to be rewarded reasonably, but not lavishly, for doing what ultimately improves patient care, or when applicable, good education and good research.

If we do not fix the severe problems affecting the leadership and governance of health care, and do not increase accountability, integrity and transparency of health care leadership and governance, we will be as much to blame as the leaders when the system collapses.

The Boards Who Ought to be Accountable for the Misbehavior of Health Care Corporations

I recently posted about the multiple conflicts of interest affecting a university health sciences leader.  While he was supposed to be running a medical school and an academic medical center, he was also responsible for the stewardship, as a board member, of three health major health care corporations, and a food and beverage corporation (whose products have bearing on nutrition and public health.)  .

This one case suggested how pervasive are conflicts of interest affecting the people at the top of health care leadership in the US, and also how such conflicts may be associated with problems for all the organizations involved.  The story originally came to my attention because students were demonstrating against the lavish compensation given the health sciences leader at a time of university cutbacks, suggesting that university leaders were paying more attention to their own enrichment than to the mission of the university.  At the same time, one of the corporations which he was stewarding (Genzyme) had to shut down a factory because the extremely expensive drug it was producing was found to be impure and adulterated, while its CEO continued to be compensated lavishly.  The other corporation (Medtronic) had to settle litigation accusing it of manufacturing defective products for hundreds of millions of dollars, while its CEO again continued to be compensated lavishly. 

So I thought it might be interesting to see who are the other stewards of these troubled corporations.  I consulted the official biographies of their board members from their 2010 proxy statements (Genzyme here, Medtronic here).  I looked for board members who also held leadership positions in other health care organizations whose interests may not be aligned with the two corporations of interest.  I also looked for those who held leadership positions in the discredited financial services corporation who helped usher in the global financial collapse.

The specifics of what I found follow.

Genzyme

Genzyme had 10 directors in 2010.  The following directors had relationships of interest:

-  Douglas A Berthiaume is "Chairman of the Children's Hospital (Boston) Trust Board, a member of the Children's Hospital board of trustees, and a Trustee of the University of Massachusetts Amherst Foundation."  Children's Hospital is a teaching hospital.  The University of Massachusetts includes a medical school. 
-  Robert J Bertolini "retired from Schering-Plough Corp following its merger with Merck & Co in November, 2009."  Schering-Plough was a large pharmaceutical company now combined with Merck to form an even larger company.
-  Gail K Boudreaux "has served since May 2008 as an Executive Vice President of United Health Group Incorporated."  Also, "she serves on the board of directors of America's Health Insurance Plans...."  UnitedHealth is one of the US' largest health insurance/ managed care corporations.  Incidentally,it has frequently misbehaved, as can be seen in this set of posts.  AHIP is the health insurance corporations' trade associations.
-  Robert J Carpenter "is Chairman of Hydra Biosciences Inc... He is also a trustee of the Immune Disease Institute, a non-profit institute affiliated with Children's Hospital in Boston...." 
-  Charles L Cooney "is a director of India-based Biocon Limited, a biotechnology healthcare company."
-  Victor J Dzau MD (discussed in the earlier post) is "Chancellor for Health Affairs and President and Chief Executive Officer of Duke University Health System...."  He "sits on the board of directors of Pepsico Inc, Anylam Inc, Medtronic Inc, and the Duke University Health System."
-  Senator Connie Mack III is "Chairman Emeritus of the parent board of the H. Lee Moffitt Cancer Center and Research Institute...."  He also is director of "EXACT Sciences Corporation and Moody's Corp."  EXACT Sciences is a biotechnology company that develops diagnostic test technology.  Moody's Corp is a financial ratings agency whose lax ratings of financial derivatives, perhaps arising from conflicts of interest produced by payments from the producers of the derivatives, have been implicated as a major cause of the global financial collapse.
-  Richard E Syron was from "January 2004 to September 8, 2008 ... Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, commonly referred to as Freddie Mac...."    Freddie Mac as bailed out and taken over by the US government when he departed, or was forced out.  Freddie Mac, was a "government-sponsored enterprise," (GSE) one of another group of companies whose enthusiastic participation in securitizing dubious mortgages was implicated as a major cause of the global financial collapse.
- Henri A Termeer (CEO of Genzyme) is a "director of Massachusetts General Hospital, a board member of Partners HealthCare, and a member of the board of fellows of Harvard Medical School." 

So the box score for Genzyme's 10 directors: six have leadership positions at teaching hospitals, academic medical centers, medical schools or their parent universities (some such institutions are lead by more than one Genzyme director).  Seven have leadership positions in other drug, device or biotechnology corporations.  One have leadership positions in health insurance/ managed care corporations.  Two had or have leadership positions in discredited financial services corporations that were implicated in the global financial collapse.

Medtronic

Medtronic had 11 directors in 2010.  The following directors had relationships of interest:

- Richard H Anderson "was Executive Vice President of UnitedHealth Group Incorporated."  As above, UnitedHealth is a health insurance/ managed care corporation.
- Victor J Dzau (see above) is "Chancellor for Health Affairs at Duke University and President and Chief Executive Officer of the Duke University Health System."  He is "a director of Alnylam Pharmaceuticals Inc, ... PepsiCo Inc, and Genzyme Corporation." (See discussion above.)
- James T Lenahan "served as President of Johnson & Johnson from 2002 until June 2004...."  He is "director of Telecris Biotherapeutics Inc, Alton Pharma Inc and Imacor Inc."  Johnson & Johnson is a large drug, device, and biotechnology company.  Telecris, and Alton Pharma are biotechnology pharmaceutical companies.  Imacor is a medical device company.
- Denise M O'Leary "is a director of Lucille Packard Children's Hospital and Stanford Hospitals and Clinics."  Also, "she was a member of the Stanford University Board of Trustees from 1996 through 2006, where she chaired the Committee of the Medical Center...."
-  Robert C Pozen is "an advisor to Gelesis Inc."  Gelesis is a biotechnology company.
-  Jack W Schuler "has been a director of Stericycle Inc since March 1990...."  He is a "director of Quidel Corporation and Elan Corporation plc...."    Stericycle company disposes of medical waste, including that produced by medical devices.  Quidel is a biotechnology and (medical diagnostic) device company.  Elan is an multinational biotechnology and pharmaceutical company.

So the box score for Genzyme's 11 directors is: Two have leadership positions at teaching hospitals, academic medical centers, medical schools or their parent universities (some such institutions are lead by more than one Genzyme director). Ten have leadership positions in other drug, device or biotechnology corporations. One has a leadership position in health insurance/ managed care corporations. None had or have leadership positions in discredited financial services corporations that were implicated in the global financial collapse.

Summary

Just to summarize the sorts of conflicting interests these relationships suggest. 

Teaching hospitals and medical schools are supposed to provide unbiased teaching, including about issues relevant to drug and device corporations, such as choice of diagnostic strategies and treatments, and relevant health policy.  They are supposed to perform unbiased research, including research that evaluates drugs and devices.  They are supposed to provide the best possible patient care at a reasonable cost, which relates to choices of and prices paid for drugs and devices. 

Other drug, device, and biotechnology corporations may be producing, or developing products that compete with those of the index corporations.

Health insurance companies ostensibly try to control costs and improve quality in part by reducing excess utilization and bargaining down prices of drugs and devices. 

So this limited case study of the boards of directors, that is, the ostensible stewards of two health care corporations, selected because they have a common member who is the leader of a large medical school and academic medical center, and which both have histories of poor management or ethical missteps showed  - that the leadership of health care organizations is incredibly interrelated, interlocked, incestuous. 

This gave an example of how pervasive are the conflicts of interest that affect all kinds of health care organizations.  Companies that ought to be competing have interlocked directors.  Companies that ought to be negotiating at arms length have interlocked directors.  Not-for-profit academic medical institutions have leaders who are also directors of companies whose drugs their patients may take, whose devices their patients may receive, whose insurance their patients may buy, and whose products and services they may teach about and evaluate through clinical research and policy research. 

This also gives an example of how the failed culture of finance may be linked to the culture of medicine and health care.  Some of the stewards of health care organizations were also the stewards of financial services corporations whose reckless, if not arrogant, greedy and amoral leadership is widely believed to have caused the global financial collapse and our ongoing economic problems. 

Finally, this suggests how top leaders of various health care organizations may be more familiar with and identify more with each other than with their organizations, their organizations' missions, and their organizations' professionals, staff, students, clients, and patients. 

What is to be done?

I strongly believe that there needs to be much more investigation, academic, journalistic, and perhaps legal, of the identity, nature, and culture of the leaders of health care, and their relationships.  A few bloggers cannot do it all.  Obviously, the anechoic effect mitigates against medical and health care academics looking into their own leaders.  However, failing to understand who is leading our march to the brink of health care failure ought not to be something such academics would want on their conscience.

Finally, and obviously, health care organizations need leaders that uphold the core values of health care, and focus on and are accountable for the mission, not on secondary responsibilities that conflict with these values and their mission, and not on self-enrichment.  Leaders ought to be rewarded reasonably, but not lavishly, for doing what ultimately improves patient care, or when applicable, good education and good research. 

If we do not fix the severe problems affecting the leadership and governance of health care, and do not increase accountability, integrity and transparency of health care leadership and governance, we will be as much to blame as the leaders when the system collapses.   

Academic Medical Center Crime Wave?

Every large group or organization has a few bad apples.  My web searches constantly turn up stories of individuals working in health care who behave unethically or commit crimes.  I do not generally discuss these cases on Health Care Renewal, since they seem unavoidable, and their sporadic appearance does not necessarily have anything to do with systemic problems in health care.

However, in the last week, I noted four cases of rather exceptionally bad behavior by individuals working in large hospital systems, and the severity and proximity of these cases made me wonder if they reflect some new trend.

Pennsylvania State University Faculty Member Charged with Rape

As reported by PennLive.com,

Former Derry Township, Dauphin County, doctor Dr. Robert L. Yarwood stands accused of using his position and influence to addict two of his patients to painkillers and raping them multiple times.

Yarwood, 56, has been charged with more than 42 criminal counts, including rape and sexual assault, stemming from allegations made in 2008 by two women, ages 40 and 45.

He is accused of giving narcotics to the women to 'exert psychological force,' said Fran Chardo, Dauphin County first assistant district attorney.

'The case, speaking abstractly, is very disturbing because of the trust relationship between the patient and the doctor,' Chardo said. 'It�s a violation of trust.'

In an interview with The Patriot-News, one of the women said she had visited Yarwood several times over the course of a year. He was prescribing her pain medication, which she eventually became addicted to. Then, she said, he raped her. 'I was paralyzed. I was in shock,' she said. 'I trusted him.'

At the time of the allegations, Yarwood was an obstetrician and gynecologist at the Penn State Milton S. Hershey Medical Center, which he joined in the late 1990s. In August 2008, the medical center was apprised of the investigation and immediately suspended Yarwood from having contact with patients.

$5 Million Embezzlement from Columbia University Medical Center

As reported by the Wall Street Journal,

A 48-year-old Bronx man has been arrested and charged with grand larceny for allegedly stealing nearly $4.5 million from Columbia University over the course of two months, authorities said Monday.

George Castro is accused of adding a TD Bank account belonging to him as a payee in the Columbia University Medical Center's accounts payable system, netting payments of $3.4 million in October and $1 million in November, authorities said. Mr. Castro, whose relationship with the university is unclear, was arrested Wednesday.

A law-enforcement official familiar with the case said Mr. Castro had $200,000 in cash in his possession when he was arrested and had withdrawn $140,000 the day before his arrest. According to a criminal complaint, Mr. Castro told investigators the money 'just appeared' in his bank account and that he had gotten 'greedy.'

Duke Surgeon and Surgical Department Business Manager Accused of Embezzlement

As reported by WRAL.com,

A former Duke University surgeon and manager have been charged with stealing $267,000 from the university, police said Tuesday.

Dr. Eric Joel DeMaria, 51, of 1101 Tacketts Pond Drive in Raleigh, and John William Cotton, 39, of 7228 Loblolly Pine Drive in Raleigh, were each charged with embezzlement of more than $100,000. Cotton also was charged with obtaining property by false pretense.

Cotton was arrested last Wednesday, and DeMaria surrendered to police Tuesday morning. Both have been released on $25,000 bonds.

DeMaria was director of Duke's bariatric surgery program, while Cotton was a business manager in the surgical department at Duke University Hospital, according to Michael Schoenfeld, Duke's vice president for public affairs.

Office Worker Accused of Stealing $3.8 Million from Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center

As reported by the New York Post,

A former worker at Memorial Sloan-Kettering stole nearly $4 million from the cancer center in a massive scheme that involved ordering a boatload of unnecessary printer cartridges and reselling them, authorities said.

The loot from the elaborate scam was used to fund a lavish lifestyle that allowed $37,000-a-year receiving clerk Marque Gumbs to move from a Bronx housing project to a luxurious Trump high-rise in the suburbs.

Gumbs, 32 -- who was arraigned yesterday in Manhattan Criminal Court on charges of grand larceny and criminal possession of stolen property -- allegedly began his scheme in 2004 by ordering extra toner cartridges and reselling them.

In one astounding stretch from October 2009 through August 2010, Gumbs ordered $1.2 million worth of toner that wasn't usable for any machine at the hospital, authorities said.

His alleged ruse cost the hospital $3.8 million.

Summary

So here is the box-score. Reported in one week were three alleged theft/ embezzlement schemes with values from $267,000 to $5 million, and one alleged series of multiple rapes. The alleged perpetrators included two academic physicians (one in surgery, one in obstetrics-gynecology), two hospital staff, one in management, and a person with an unclear relationship to the hospital. All involved large, prestigious academic medical centers.

So, again, maybe these were just coincidences. However, it may be that there is a real trend toward bigger and more spectacular thefts and embezzlements from big, not for profit health care institutions.  The most likely explanation is simply that the increasingly huge amounts of money flowing through such institutions attracts those who go to where the money is, and that the increased complexity of the bureaucracy of ever-growing health care institutions makes it easier to hide such thefts.  At least, this odd string of cases should prompt more questions about the conventional wisdom that it is good for health care organizations to grow ever larger. 

However, just to be speculative, note that three of these incidents occurred at institutions whose leadership has attracted our attention before.  We discussed conflicts of interest affecting one Columbia academic leader here, and the prevalence of leaders of failed financial services companies on the New York-Presbyterian board here.  We discussed a leader of two of the firms most involved in the global financial collapse who was also the chairman of the board of Duke University here.  A quick skim of Memorial Sloan-Kettering's Board of Overseers (in its 2009 annual report) showed the presence of at least two leaders of failed financial services firms heavily involved in the global financial collapse (E Stanley O'Neal, former CEO of Merrill Lynch, and Sanford I Weill, former CEO of Citigroup).  The speculation is that as academic medical centers and hospital systems and their parent universities have increasingly been recipients of the "stewardship," and hence immersed in the culture of the financial services industry, particularly firms which contributed to the global financial collapse, the culture of health care became increasingly laissez faire, anything goes, wild, wild west, and so it got easier for the wrong people to be hired, and for the wrong people to pull off truly spectacular capers.

I submit that the first criterion for being a trustee or director, and hence ostensibly a steward of an academic medical institution should be devotion to the mission of the organization, not size of one's contribution.

What a Conflicted Web We Weave: More About Leaders of Financial Firms Influencing Policy in the Guise of Independent Academics

The issue of conflicted academic economists providing public policy recommendations just got bigger.  As discussed by Felix Salmon in his blog for Reuters, and by Nancy Folbre in the Economix blog for the New York Times,  a new study by Epstein and Carrick-Hagenbarth showed that some very prominent economists who frequently make pronouncements about financial policy often failed to disclose some major conflicts of interest. 

In summary, they identified "two groups of economists that were prominent in the field of financial economics and which had taken a public stance on financial regulation."  Some of these economists also had prominent advisory roles for government economic agencies, including the US Federal Reserve, the US Council of Economic Advisers, the Indian Finance Ministry, the Bank of Finland, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund. The authors did an extensive search for the economists' financial ties to financial corporations, which probably detected most relationships such as membership on the boards of directors of public companies, but may have missed consulting arrangements.  They found that 12 of 19 had such relationships, mostly positions on boards of directors or ownership interests.  They found that all but one of the economists with such relationships failed to identify these relationships in the majority of their academic papers and writings in the media.  The one economist who always disclosed his relationships in the media only wrote articles for the private financial firm for which he worked.

So major financial conflicts of interest were prevalent among "prominent economists who write op-eds for newspapers, they testify on public panels, they take positions as advisers for politicians and they are interviewed by the media. Academic economists often convey the impression that they occupy these positions as independent objective experts."  The authors concluded:

Academic economists serve as experts in the media, molding public opinion. They are also important players in government policy. If those that are creating the culture around financial regulation as well as influencing policy at the government level for financial reform also have a significant, if hidden, conflict of interest, our public is not likely to be well-served.

They also noted that economics as a profession does not even have a formal code of ethics, and in particular has never embraced any necessity for disclosing, managing, or restricting conflicts of interest.

We had previously discussed anecdotal but striking evidence that some of the most prominent economists who influenced public policy up to and after the great recession/ global financial crisis also had major but undisclosed financial ties to financial institutions. It now looks like conflicts of interest could be as prevalent among those who are influential in economics as they may be among those who are influential in medicine, health care, and health care policy.

This further corroborates the hypothesis that academic medical institutions are so comfortable with their faculty and leaders' conflicts of interest because they exist in a larger academic culture in which such conflicts are standard operating procedure.  Academic institutions may be particularly happy with economists' conflicts of interest because they involve such large amounts of money. Felix Salmon gave the example of  Paul Krugman who when he worked as an economist could command a $40-50,000 fee per speech, easily more than an order of magnitude more than the going rate for medical talks.  Furthermore, as we have noted before, (e.g., here, here, and here) many prominent academic institutions that incorporate medical schools and academic medical centers have boards of directors dominated by leaders of finance.  Now it appears that these leaders' economic interests may lead them to encourage conflicts of interest among their faculty and administration.

So not only do conflicts of interest appear to be a fundamental problem for medicine and health care, they may pose a fundamental problem for society as a whole.

Clearly, as Epstein and Carrick-Hagenbarth wrote, economists, like all professionals who can influence public policy, ought to have a code of ethics, and that code, at a minimum, ought to require full disclosure of all conflicts of interest.  Economists who write about policy in the media, write policy-relevant academic articles, and/or who advise non-profit organizations and government agencies should at a minimum reveal all such conflicts.  Similarly, of course, physicians and health policy/ care/ services researchers who write about or otherwise may influence health care policy should at a minimum reveal all such conflicts.

Meanwhile, extreme skepticism about policy advice by apparently independent academics and experts is warranted.  We risk sliding into the cynical position that all major policy is now being made by imperial CEOs and their cronies and paid agents. 

What a Conflicted Web We Weave: Academic Economists, Finance, the Global Economic Meltdown, and the Impending Health Care Collapse

We have been writing about conflicts of interest in health care now for a long time.  We started with a focus on academic physicians'  and leaders' financial ties to pharmaceutical/ biotechnology/ device companies, then went on to the intense conflicts generated by academic medical and other health care non-profit leader who also sit on boards of directors of for profit health care corporations, and to conflicts affecting various kinds of respected not-for-profit health care organizations, like medical societies and patient advocacy groups.

Meanwhile, we uncovered the curious dominance of the boards of some health care organizations by leaders in the finance world, including some of the leaders of the failed companies that brought us the "great recession."  This did seem like a leadership problem for health care, in terms of the dominance of health care leadership by the elite of another industry that did not exactly seem to share the values we physicians swear to uphold.  However, it did not seem to be a conflict of interest problem, until now.

The Chronicle of Higher Education just published an article by the director of a soon to be released documentary on conflicts of interest and academics, but this time academic economics.

Charles Ferguson, the author, used as an example the Larry Summers, the former President of Harvard University (and hence leader of the Harvard Medical School, School of Public Health, and Harvard's teaching hospitals).  We had commented here about Summers' poor fit for the role of an academic medical leader, and here and here about the dominance of Harvard leadership by leaders of (sometimes failed) financial institutions.  Ferguson summarized (bad pun, sorry) the problem thus:

Summers is unquestionably brilliant, as all who have dealt with him, including myself, quickly realize. And yet rarely has one individual embodied so much of what is wrong with economics, with academe, and indeed with the American economy.

The problem is essentially one of huge conflicts of interest:

the revolving door is now a three-way intersection. Summers's career is the result of an extraordinary and underappreciated scandal in American society: the convergence of academic economics, Wall Street, and political power.

Summers bear huge responsibility for the current economic mess:

Consider: As a rising economist at Harvard and at the World Bank, Summers argued for privatization and deregulation in many domains, including finance. Later, as deputy secretary of the treasury and then treasury secretary in the Clinton administration, he implemented those policies. Summers oversaw passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, which repealed Glass-Steagall, permitted the previously illegal merger that created Citigroup, and allowed further consolidation in the financial sector. He also successfully fought attempts by Brooksley Born, chair of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission in the Clinton administration, to regulate the financial derivatives that would cause so much damage in the housing bubble and the 2008 economic crisis. He then oversaw passage of the Commodity Futures Modernization Act, which banned all regulation of derivatives, including exempting them from state antigambling laws.

Also,

Over the past decade, Summers continued to advocate financial deregulation, both as president of Harvard and as a University Professor after being forced out of the presidency.

Not only did Summers set up the structure that allowed reckless bets with other people' money on opaque financial derivatives by finance leaders who stood to make huge gains if they won their bets, but could foist all losses on others, but he actively attempted those who tried to warn us all of the impending economic collapse.

Summers remained close to Rubin and to Alan Greenspan, a former chairman of the Federal Reserve. When other economists began warning of abuses and systemic risk in the financial system deriving from the environment that Summers, Greenspan, and Rubin had created, Summers mocked and dismissed those warnings. In 2005, at the annual Jackson Hole, Wyo., conference of the world's leading central bankers, the chief economist of the International Monetary Fund, Raghuram Rajan, presented a brilliant paper that constituted the first prominent warning of the coming crisis. Rajan pointed out that the structure of financial-sector compensation, in combination with complex financial products, gave bankers huge cash incentives to take risks with other people's money, while imposing no penalties for any subsequent losses. Rajan warned that this bonus culture rewarded bankers for actions that could destroy their own institutions, or even the entire system, and that this could generate a 'full-blown financial crisis' and a 'catastrophic meltdown.'

When Rajan finished speaking, Summers rose up from the audience and attacked him, calling him a 'Luddite,' dismissing his concerns, and warning that increased regulation would reduce the productivity of the financial sector. (Ben Bernanke, Tim Geithner, and Alan Greenspan were also in the audience.)

Amazingly, rather than ending up an economic pariah after that, Summers regained power over the economy in the last few years.

Then, after the 2008 financial crisis and its consequent recession, Summers was placed in charge of coordinating U.S. economic policy, deftly marginalizing others who challenged him. Under the stewardship of Summers, Geithner, and Bernanke, the Obama administration adopted policies as favorable toward the financial sector as those of the Clinton and Bush administrations�quite a feat. Never once has Summers publicly apologized or admitted any responsibility for causing the crisis. And now Harvard is welcoming him back.

Summers was tightly aligned with the finance world, and benefited from the dominance of financial leaders on Harvard's board (see post here):

After Summers left the Clinton administration, his candidacy for president of Harvard was championed by his mentor Robert Rubin, a former CEO of Goldman Sachs, who was his boss and predecessor as treasury secretary. Rubin, after leaving the Treasury Department�where he championed the law that made Citigroup's creation legal�became both vice chairman of Citigroup and a powerful member of Harvard's governing board.

Yet in between his government and academic leadership roles, Summers got rich from finance firms' money.

Summers became wealthy through consulting and speaking engagements with financial firms. Between 2001 and his entry into the Obama administration, he made more than $20-million from the financial-services industry. (His 2009 federal financial-disclosure form listed his net worth as $17-million to $39-million.)

Ferguson went on to list several other conflicted academic economists:

The route to the 2008 financial crisis, and the economic problems that still plague us, runs straight through the economics discipline. And it's due not just to ideology; it's also about straightforward, old-fashioned money.

Prominent academic economists (and sometimes also professors of law and public policy) are paid by companies and interest groups to testify before Congress, to write papers, to give speeches, to participate in conferences, to serve on boards of directors, to write briefs in regulatory proceedings, to defend companies in antitrust cases, and, of course, to lobby. [Ed: they are thus the "key opinion leaders" of economics and economic policy.]  This is now, literally, a billion-dollar industry. The Law and Economics Consulting Group, started 22 years ago by professors at the University of California at Berkeley (David Teece in the business school, Thomas Jorde in the law school, and the economists Richard Gilbert and Gordon Rausser), is now a $300-million publicly held company. Others specializing in the sale (or rental) of academic expertise include Competition Policy (now Compass Lexecon), started by Richard Gilbert and Daniel Rubinfeld, both of whom served as chief economist of the Justice Department's Antitrust Division in the Clinton administration; the Analysis Group; and Charles River Associates.

In my film you will see many famous economists looking very uncomfortable when confronted with their financial-sector activities; others appear only on archival video, because they declined to be interviewed. You'll hear from:

Martin Feldstein, a Harvard professor, a major architect of deregulation in the Reagan administration, president for 30 years of the National Bureau of Economic Research, and for 20 years on the boards of directors of both AIG, which paid him more than $6-million, and AIG Financial Products, whose derivatives deals destroyed the company. Feldstein has written several hundred papers, on many subjects; none of them address the dangers of unregulated financial derivatives or financial-industry compensation.

Glenn Hubbard, chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers in the first George W. Bush administration, dean of Columbia Business School, adviser to many financial firms, on the board of Metropolitan Life ($250,000 per year), and formerly on the board of Capmark, a major commercial mortgage lender, from which he resigned shortly before its bankruptcy, in 2009. In 2004, Hubbard wrote a paper with William C. Dudley, then chief economist of Goldman Sachs, praising securitization and derivatives as improving the stability of both financial markets and the wider economy.

Frederic Mishkin, a professor at the Columbia Business School, and a member of the Federal Reserve Board from 2006 to 2008. He was paid $124,000 by the Icelandic Chamber of Commerce to write a paper praising its regulatory and banking systems, two years before the Icelandic banks' Ponzi scheme collapsed, causing $100-billion in losses. His 2006 federal financial-disclosure form listed his net worth as $6-million to $17-million.

Laura Tyson, a professor at Berkeley, director of the National Economic Council in the Clinton administration, and also on the Board of Directors of Morgan Stanley, which pays her $350,000 per year.

Richard Portes, a professor at London Business School and founding director of the British Centre for Economic Policy Research, paid by the Icelandic Chamber of Commerce to write a report praising Iceland's financial system in 2007, only one year before it collapsed.

And John Campbell, chairman of Harvard's economics department, who finds it very difficult to explain why conflicts of interest in economics should not concern us.

I once naively thought that the primary conflict of interest problems affecting academia involved health care, the dependence of medical schools and academic medical centers on commercial research funding, the emphasis these schools placed on faculty ties to commercial firms, leading to faculty "key opinion leaders" functioning as marketers of drugs and devices operating under the cloak of academia, and the major conflicts of academic leaders who also sit on health care corporate boards.

Now I wonder if all this came to pass because academic leaders already were comfortable with conflicts of interest after having profited from conflicts generated by relationships with the finance industry.

This now suggests that the dominance of university boards of trustees by finance leaders is a conflict of interest issue, too.

It also suggests that we in medicine should be paying more attention to how conflicts of interest shape not only the marketing of drugs and devices, but the health care policy that has lead to our currently dysfunctional system. If economists paid by finance companies could have been a major cause of the global financial meltdown, could health care policy experts paid by health care corporations be a major cause of our collapsing health care system?

Hat tip to the Naked Capitalism blog. See additional comments on the University Diaries blog and on Felix Salmon's blog.

Where There's Smoke? ... A University President Who Simultaneously Lead a Failed Financial Company and a Tobacco Company Which Apologized for International Bribery

A long time ago, in 2006, we first blogged about a "new species of conflict of interest" which we thought might prove to be even more important than those afflicting health care that were then starting to be discussed.  This involved health care organizational leaders who were simultaneously members of the boards of directors of for-profit health care corporations.  We posited these conflicts would be particularly important because being on the board of directors entails not just a financial incentive.  It ostensibly requires board members to "demonstrate unyielding loyalty to the company's shareholders" [Per Monks RAG, Minow N. Corporate Governance, 3rd edition. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2004. P.200.]   Thus, for example, the conflict posed by the president of a university, to whom a medical school and academic medical center report, who also is the director of a pharmaceutical company, would be extreme.

Since then, we noted yet another variant on this theme, university presidents who were supposedly the top leaders of failed financial firms, and then who did various dances to try to avoid accountability for these firms' fates.  That theme recently made it to the big time, a front page article on the Sunday Business section of the New York Times.

The most extreme version was the case of that of Eugene Trani, the former President of Virginia Commonwealth University ( full disclosure: I spent 7 years on the faculty of its medical school, and am still an adjunct faculty member).  Trani turned out to be on the board of a tobacco company, and soon after this was revealed, retired from the presidency (see most recent blog post here).

Now a Washington Post blogger has yet another twist on this case:

Eugene P. Trani left the presidency of Virginia Commonwealth University in 2009 after improving the school and expanding its presence in downtown Richmond. But Trani was also a director of LandAmerica Financial Group, a Richmond-area title insurer that went belly-up in 2008, taking with it millions in investors' money.

Today, Trani is on the board of Richmond-based Universal Corporation, a global tobacco marketer. Universal's subsidiaries have just agreed to pay $8.98 million in a tobacco bribery scandal that stretches from Brazil to Thailand to Africa. The firm has issued a public apology. Trani received $159,032 in total compensation for his board service.

So Trani was not only on the board of directors of a tobacco company, he was on the board of directors of a tobacco company that was forced to settle charges of international bribery and issue apologies for same, and just to ice the cake, was on the board of a failed financial company whose failure affected residents of the locality which his university served.

As the saying goes, "the fish rots from the head down."  How can academic leaders expect integrity from their faculty when they willingly take on such grotesque conflicts?  Leaders who thus try to serve two, or many masters are likely to run health care organizations that do not serve their primary constituents, patients who expect good care, learners who expect honest, competent teaching, and the public who expects important, unbiased research, well.  If we really want to reform health care, we need leaders who put the mission, not their own pocketbooks, prestige, and cronies, first.

Are Ill-Informed Leaders the Cause of Drug Manufacturing Mishaps?

Fundamental Corporate Failures

In the last few years, there seems to have been an epidemic of once revered companies suddenly unable to perform the most basic functions necessary for their businesses.  Finance firms ran out of money and ended up bailed out or bankrupt.  An automobile firm produced cars that seemed to accelerate out of control.  Another automobile company, once the world's biggest, went bankrupt and had to be bailed out by the government. An oil company took months to cap a blown out well. 

In the health care world, drug companies which could no longer manufacture pure and unadulterated drugs.  Baxter International sold deadly contaminated heparin (post here). Johnson and Johnson sold contaminated or wrongly dosed over-the counter childrens' medicines (post here).

Another Troubled Johnson and Johnson Factory

Now yet more problems have surfaced at a Johnson and Johnson factory.  As reported by the AP:

A dozen recent federal inspections of a Johnson & Johnson factory for heartburn and other nonprescription medicines show a host of violations that could affect the quality and makeup of the drugs.

A new report on inspections at the Lancaster, Pa., factory in the past month indicates a pattern of ignoring rules for manufacturing and quality, failure to investigate problems that could affect the composition of products, carelessness in cleaning and maintaining equipment, and shoddy record-keeping.

In some cases, medicine batches made during equipment failures were not checked for quality.

Food and Drug Administration investigators had to ask for information many times in some cases, and then wait days to get it.

The scope of the problems was large:

The inspection report, released Wednesday, lists 12 different types of violations, from not determining the impact of equipment failures 'on the manufacturing process and products' to incomplete records of investigations into 'unexplained discrepancies' in manufacturing. The latter problem occurs 'whether or not the batch has already been distributed,' the report states.

Some examples were:

_'Laboratory controls do not include the establishment of scientifically sound and appropriate test procedures to assure that drug products conform to appropriate standards of identity, strength, quality and purity.'

_Procedures to prevent 'objectionable microorganisms' from getting into medicines appear not to have been followed.

_'Deviations from written test procedures are not justified.'

_Staff were not following up 'to determine the causes for repeated mix-up of tablets.'

_Written procedures for cleaning and maintenance did not have enough detail about the methods, equipment and materials to be used.

_The plant did not have recent drug production and quality control records readily available to the inspectors, as is required.

_Samples of drug products taken to determine if they met written specifications were not properly identified.

_There was no preventive maintenance program for at least five types of complex manufacturing or testing equipment.

Previous Problems at Johnson and Johnson Factories
Note that just a few days before this hit the news, the Philadelphia Inquirer reported this follow-up from the problems at the plant in Fort Washington, PA run by Johnson and Johnson's subsidiary McNeil Consumer Healthcare

A federal grand jury is investigating problems at the now-shuttered McNeil Consumer Healthcare plant in Fort Washington that triggered the recall of children's Tylenol and other popular pediatric medicines, according to the company.

The existence of the investigation was made public Tuesday by Louise Mehrotra, vice president for investor relations for Johnson & Johnson, McNeil's parent company.

That report reminded us that there have been problems at a third Johnson and Johnson plant:

[Johnson and Johnson subsidiary] McNeil is now dealing with FDA issues at three drug-making facilities, including one in Las Piedras, Puerto Rico.

Problems at the Las Piedras plant last year set in motion the investigation at Fort Washington.

At Las Piedras, FDA inspectors were chiefly concerned about why it took McNeil more than a year to respond to consumer complaints of a musty smell associated with Tylenol caplets produced at the plant. The smell was traced to a chemical used to treat wooden pallets at the plant.

So three Johnson and Johnson manufacturing plants have recently allegedly failed to uphold basic quality standards, and thus have made medicines that ranged from musty smelling to contaminated. Clearly, the most basic responsibility of a drug manufacturer is to supply fresh, pure, unadulterated drugs, and now Johnson and Johnson, a once iconic American drug and device company, seems to be having trouble fulfilling this responsibility.

Caused by Leadership Shortcomings?
It seems that health care firms, like so many others, have been distracted by financing fantasies and marketing marvels from the most fundamental parts of their business. One wonders how responsible are leaders with little understanding of the fundamentals of the fields in which their firms operate, and who seem to just get richer no badly how their firms perform.

Note that the current Johnson and Johnson CEO William C Weldon's background is in "sales,marketing and international management," not manufacturing, engineering, chemistry, or the biological sciences, per the company's 2010 proxy statement.  In 2009, with one factory already under investigation, his total compensation was over $30,000,000.

The Johnson and Johnson board of directors all get more than $200,000 per year in compensation.  The board does include two biologists and two physicians  (Prof Mary Sue Coleman, is "professor of biological chemistry" at the University of Michigan; Michael M E Johns, MD, a physician; Susan L Lindquist, Professor of Biology at Massachusetts Institute of Technology; and David Satcher, MD a physician.)  However, while it also contains the retired CEOs of a telecommunications company, an electronics company, an airline, a food company, and an bank/ finance company,  it does not seem to contain anyone with experience in manufacturing, much less pharmaceutical manufacturing.  

On the other hand, it includes several people with leadership positions in non-profit health care institutions  with whose primary responsibilities their Johnson and Johnson board membership may conflict.  (Mary Sue Coleman is President of the University of Michigan; Michael M E Johns, Chancellor of Emory University, member of the Institute of Medicine, member of the editorial board of JAMA, and chair of the publications committee of Academic Medicine; Susan L Lindquist, member of the Institute of Medicine; Leo F Mullin, Chairman of the Board of the Juvenile Diabetes Research Foundation; William D Perez, Trustee of Cornell University, and Trustee of Northwestern Memorial Hospital;  and David Satcher, board member for the Kaiser Family Foundation.)   

Note that leaders of non-profit academic health care institutions who also serve on boards of for-profit health care corporations often justify the apparent conflict by the need to "have a voice and interact with the business world," as explained (see post here) by a spokesperson for Mary Sue Coleman.  A university president who sits on a corporate board to "understand what the commercial world is doing," may have not learned enough about that world to make sure it is doing it well.

Finally, several Johnson and Johnson board members are former or current leaders of some of the financial firms whose problems lead to the global financial meltdown, or "great recession," (Anne M Mulcahy has been a member of the Citigroup board since 2004, and was on the FNMA board from 2000 to 2004, both nearly failed, and required government bailouts to survive; Leo F Mullin, currently Senior Advisor to Goldman Sachs Capital Partners, a subsidiary of Goldman Sachs, which just settled charges by the SEC that it misled investors; and Charles Prince, CEO of Citigroup from 2003 to 2007.)   Are these the sort of people we should trust to uphold the fundamental quality of drug manufacturing? 

Health care organizations are increasingly saddled with leaders who do not understand the fundamentals of the health care environment, are not pledged to support their missions, and may be distracted by conflicts of interest.  Such leaders may be increasingly responsible for the dysfunction of modern health care.  True health care reform requires leadership that understands the context, and supports the mission without conflict.